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The New Belgian Law on Biobanks - Some Comments from an Ethical Perspective 
 
Sigrid Sterckx and Kristof Van Assche 
 
Abstract 
On 19 December 2008 the Official Journal of Belgium published the „Law regarding the 
procurement and use of human body material destined for human medical applications or for 
scientific research purposes‟. This paper will comment on various aspects of the Law: its scope of 
application (what is understood by „body material‟?); its concept of „residual human body 
material‟ (with far-reaching implications for the type of consent required for research); the nature 
of actions with and uses of human body material that are explicitly prohibited; the right of donors 
to be informed of relevant information revealed by the use of their body material; and the special 
responsibilities placed on hospital ethics committees. As will be argued in this paper, several of 
these provisions are highly problematic from an ethical point of view, especially those relating to 
consent. 
Meanwhile, the Minister of Public Health has asked the Belgian Advisory Committee on 
Bioethics for advice on the incorporation of the „presumed consent‟ model, that applies to post 
mortem organ donation, into the biobank Law‟s provisions on post mortem removal and use of 
body material. This aspect of the Law effectively extends the „presumed consent‟ regime, both 
from organs to body material in general, and from therapeutic uses to research uses. 
Keywords: biobanks – ethics – Belgian law – research on human body material 
 
 
Introduction: Scope of application of the Law 
Biomedical research is said to rely increasingly upon the study of extensive collections of 
biological material (biobanks), e.g. of human tissues. In Belgium, biobanks are regulated by the 
„Law regarding the procurement and use of human body material destined for human medical 
applications or for scientific research purposes‟. This Law – which is intended inter alia to 
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implement Directives 2004/23/EU, 2006/17/EU and 2006/86/EU – was adopted on 19 December 
2008 and has entered into force on 1 December 2009, although a Royal Decree (executive order) 
regarding some of the Law‟s most important provisions is still awaited [10]. In this paper we will 
comment on various aspects of this Law.
1
 
The Law is intended to detail the conditions for “the donation, retrieval, procurement, testing, 
processing, preservation, storage, distribution and use of human body material” (Art. 3(1)). It 
defines “human body material” as “every biological body material, including human tissues and 
cells, gametes, embryos, and foetuses, as well as substances extracted therefrom, whatever the 
degree to which they have been processed” (Art. 2(1)).2 Explicitly included in the scope of 
application of the Law are “the removal of, as well as all actions performed with stem cells, 
regardless of their source, inter alia [stem cells] from cord blood, peripheral blood, bone marrow 
and those of mesenchymal origin” (Art. 3(2)).  
Explicitly excluded from the scope of the Law are: “(a) the removal of organs with a view to 
transplantation”, already covered by the Law of 13 June 1986 regarding the retrieval and 
transplantation of organs; “(b) the actions, performed on blood and on elements and derivatives 
of blood”, already covered by the Law of 5 July 1994 regarding blood and derivatives of blood of 
human origin; “(c) the removal of and actions performed with human body material with a view 
to an autologous application during a single operation”; “(d) the donation and the actions 
performed with a merely diagnostic purpose for the benefit of the person from whom the body 
material is removed, provided that the body material is not destined for another use” and the 
manipulation of, among other things, “hair, body hair, nails, urine, mother‟s milk, stools, tears 
and sweat” (Art. 3(3)).3 
 
                                                 
1
 We do not have the space here to comment on all the ethically relevant dimensions of the Law – e.g. we cannot go 
into its provisions regarding (non)commercialisation and privacy. 
2
 Official versions of the Law exist only in Dutch and French. All quotes herein are translations by the authors. Any 
emphasis in quotes from the Law is added by the authors. 
3
 It is also explicitly mentioned that the Law does not affect the provisions of the Law of 11 May 2003 regarding 
research on embryos in vitro, i.e. it does not apply to the removal of eggs in the context of assisted reproduction. 
Fertility centres are equated with banks for human body material (definition see infra) and actions with gametes and 
embryos may only be performed in such centres (Art. 3(4)). 
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“Banks for human body material” and “biobanks” 
In order to regulate the management of human body material, the Law creates two new 
structures: “banks for human body material” and “biobanks”. A “bank for human body material” 
is defined as “the organisational structure, which carries out [the procuring, testing, processing, 
preserving, storing or distributing, including the import and export, of human body material]. 
This structure also has [...] the sole responsibility to decide on the allocation of human body 
material” (Art. 2(24)). Banks for human body material may only be established within the 
framework of accredited hospitals or faculties of medicine of universities. They are responsible 
for controlling the distribution of human body material and should ensure the largest possible 
availability of such material for medical and scientific use [2]. 
A “biobank” is defined in the Law as a “structure which stores and provides human body 
material, exclusively for scientific research, which is not intended for any application on humans” 
(Art. 2(27)). Such a structure may be established within the framework of accredited hospitals or 
faculties of medicine – implying that a bank for human body material can itself be a biobank – or 
it may be created by a private organization (e.g. a pharmaceutical company). Biobanks require an 
accreditation, awarded inter alia on the basis of a positive advice from an ethics committee [2]. 
 
Actions with and uses of human body material that are explicitly prohibited by the Law 
The Law prohibits the following actions with human body material (Art. 8(1)):  
“(1) The removal of, and each action with, human body material within the scope of this law, that 
is not performed with a preventative, diagnostic, or therapeutic purpose which is scientifically 
grounded in a precise manner or with a precise and relevant goal concerning scientific research 
the goal of which is specified”;  
“(2) Any use of human body material within the scope of application of this law, other than with 
a diagnostic, preventative, or therapeutic purpose which is scientifically grounded in a precise 
manner or with a precise and relevant goal concerning scientific research the goal of which is 
specified, and for which a positive advice has been given by an ethics committee as described in 
the law of 7 May 2004 regarding experiments on the human person”;  
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“(3) Any removal of human body material whereby the expected consequences for the living 
donor are not proportional to the goal that is strived at”; and  
“(4) The removal and storage of human body material, with a view to an autologous or later 
allogenic use, for a particular and identified recipient, except if (a) the person for whom the 
material is destined either exhibits a scientifically demonstrated exceptional risk, at the moment 
of the removal and/or the procurement, of a pathology for which the utility of the said actions is 
scientifically demonstrated, or suffers from such a pathology; or (b) the human body material 
remains available for therapeutic use in another person and is registered to be used in that way”. 
Interestingly, prohibiting the removal and storage of human body material with a view to later 
use for a particular and identified recipient – except if an exceptional risk exists for the recipient 
or if the material remains available for use in another (non-identified) person – implies inter alia 
that cord blood may not be stored exclusively for one’s own or one’s relatives future use, but 
must if stored remain available for non-specified third parties.  
As mentioned in the Parliamentary debates preceding the adoption of the Law, this prohibition is 
founded on the principles of solidarity, non-discrimination and universal access to high quality 
healthcare [2].Indeed, private banks (for autologous use) undermine the effectiveness of public 
banks. By including this provision into the Law, Parliament obviously intended to outlaw the 
activities of certain cord blood banks such as Cryo-Save. This biobank freezes stem cells 
exclusively for autologous use, advertises itself as “Europe‟s leading stem cell bank” and claims 
to currently hold 130,000 samples (up from 5000 in 2002) [9]. 
In our view, biobanks of this nature should indeed not be allowed to operate anywhere.
4
 As the 
ethics advisory group of the President of the European Commission, the so-called European 
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), already stated in 2004: 
“The legitimacy of commercial cord blood banks for autologous use should be questioned 
as they sell a service, which has presently no real use regarding therapeutic options. Thus 
                                                 
4
 For various compelling arguments against private cord blood banking, see [13, 4]. 
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they promise more than they can deliver. The activities of such banks raise serious ethical 
criticisms.” [5].5 
 
The donors‟ right to relevant information regarding their health 
Another notable feature of the Law is that donors are granted the right to be informed if the use of 
their body material yields important health-related information. According to Art. 11(1): “If, in 
case of an action performed on human body material or the use of human body material, analyses 
provide meaningful information regarding the health status of the donor, the donor has a right to 
this information. […] The physicians who learn such information in the context of an action with 
or use of the material, the guardians of the human body material and the chief physician of the 
hospital where the removal took place are, each in the context of their function and role, 
responsible for the application of [this provision]”. The donor‟s right not to know is recognized 
by Art. 11 (2), in accordance with the 2002 Act on Patients‟ Rights. 
In our view, the inclusion into the Law of a provision explicitly recognizing a donor‟s right to 
important health-related information is to be applauded, not least on the basis of reciprocity – the 
donor made her material available for research use, so it is only reasonable to require those who 
benefit from the availability of the material to ensure that if relevant information is revealed, the 
donor receives that information. We obviously agree with many commentators that this demands 
time and effort from the researchers/physicians involved, but not with the conclusion drawn by 
some that the donors‟ interests must be sacrificed for the sake of the “efficiency” of research. 
However, the wording of the relevant provision in the Belgian Law immediately gives rise to a 
host of questions. To mention but a few: What would count as “meaningful” information?; What 
if diverging interpretations exist regarding the relevance of the information?; What if the 
“meaningful” information is discovered by researchers who are not physicians?; and What if the 
donor can no longer be contacted?  
                                                 
5
 Sadly, however, at the same time Cryo-Save was one of the partners in an EU funded 6
th
 Framework Program 
project (Crystal). 
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As to the donor‟s right not to know, the question arises as to how a donor is supposed to know 
whom to advise that she wishes to exercise this right (as provided by the 2002 Act on Patients‟ 
Rights to which the Law refers). 
Moreover, ascribing responsibility to three different (sets of) actors seems to entail a significant 
risk of what social psychologists such as Albert Bandura (2002) call “diffusion of responsibility”, 
which obscures the individual responsibility of everyone involved and may result in nobody 
providing the information to the donor even if aware that it would clearly be in the donor‟s 
interest [1]. 
 
Consent from living donors to uses of human body material for research purposes 
The Law contains an extensive chapter on donor consent, the provisions of which “do not apply if 
the removal of and all actions with the human body material exclusively take place for a 
scientifically accepted directly preventative, diagnostic or therapeutic purpose for the sake of the 
donor” (Art. 9). Hence, if the material is also or only used for research purposes, the consent 
provisions are applicable. 
Removal of body material from minors, prolonged minors and incompetent persons 
The Law stipulates as a general principle that “the removal of human body material from living 
humans can only be carried out on a non-minor donor who has consented to this in advance [in 
accordance with Art. 10(5) – discussed below]” (Art. 10(1)). However, “If the removal of human 
body material from living humans normally can not have serious consequences for the donor and 
the removal concerns cells and tissues which regenerate, or if the removal takes place for 
autologous purposes, it can, despite (1), be carried out on minors and non-minors who have the 
status of prolonged minors or who are incompetent” (Art. 10(3)). Such removal requires the 
consent of the donor‟s representative (in accordance with the 2002 Act on Patients‟ Rights). 
The latter provision is clearly not in accordance with the Council of Europe‟s Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine of 4 April 1997 [3].
6
 Art. 20(2) of this Convention allows “the 
                                                 
6
 This Convention (commonly referred to as the „Oviedo Convention‟) has not been ratified by Belgium, mainly 
because of its Art. 18(2), forbidding the creation of human embryos for research purposes. The travaux préparatoires of 
the biobank Law document a discussion in Parliament regarding this inconsistency with the Oviedo Convention. The 
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removal of regenerative tissue from a person who does not have the capacity to consent” only 
when: 
“(i) there is no compatible donor available who has the capacity to consent;  
(ii) the recipient is a brother or sister of the donor;  
(iii) the donation must have the potential to be life-saving for the recipient;  
(iv) the authorisation [...] has been given specifically and in writing, in accordance with the law and 
with the approval of the competent body;  
(v) the potential donor concerned does not object”. 
Removal of body material from non-minors 
The consent provisions to be observed in cases of non-minor donors (i.e. in standard cases) differ in 
morally significant ways, depending on the „type‟ of use proposed for the body material (“primary 
use” versus “secondary use”) and on whether the material is “residual” or not. 
Proceeding from the general principle that human body material can only be removed from living 
humans after consent has been given (Art. 10(1) above), the Law then goes on to specify that: 
“The consent for the removal and any use of body material of living humans [...] must be given in 
an informed, conscious and free fashion. The donor […] must be systematically informed of the 
use of the body material and the purpose of such use, and must consent to this in advance. This 
consent must be given in writing and the object and scope of the consent must be specified. The 
consent must be dated and signed by the person or persons whose consent is required. The 
consent for the use of the material can be withdrawn at any time before the material has been 
subjected to any action after having been procured” (Art. 10(5)).  
However, as noted above, the Law distinguishes between “primary” and “secondary” uses of 
human body material. The former, according to Art. 2(29), concern “any use of the human body 
material to which the donor has explicitly and specifically consented in the context of the 
removal”, whereas “secondary” use is defined as “any other use of human body material than that 
                                                                                                                                                              
Minister of Public Health‟s response was that this Convention is overly restrictive and prevents the removal of tissues 
and cells for research purposes. We do not have the space to elaborate on this issue here. 
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to which the donor has [explicitly and specifically] consented in the context of the removal” (Art. 
2(30)).  
In cases of “secondary” use, Art. 20(1) requires that “the donor must be informed […] and his 
explicit written consent must be obtained in advance [in accordance with Art. 10(5) above]”. So, 
at first sight, the Law seems to prescribe an „informed consent‟ (or „explicit consent‟) regime for 
uses of human body material for research purposes. However, it is added in the same provision 
that: “In case it is impossible to ask for consent to the secondary use, or should this question be 
exceptionally inappropriate, secondary use can take place after an ethics committee [in 
accordance with the law on experimentation on human beings] has issued a positive advice”. 
Moreover, in contrast with its provisions on informed/explicit consent for the primary and 
secondary use of human body material, the law posits presumed consent for the use of “residual 
human body material” for purposes of scientific research. This category of “residual” material is 
defined as “the part of the body material that is removed with a view to diagnosis or treatment of 
the donor which, after a sufficient and relevant part is stored for making, refining or completing 
the diagnosis or treatment of the donor on the basis of new scientific information, is superfluous 
with regard to these purposes and may thus be destroyed” (Art. 2(33)). Consent for research uses 
of such material “is presumed to have been given insofar as the donor [or a surrogate] has not 
announced her refusal [to the doctor responsible for the removal or to the senior doctor of the 
hospital] prior to the initiation of any action with the residual human body material”. It is added 
that: “For the application [of that provision], the intended use of the material as well as the 
possibility for the donor or surrogate to refuse, has to be notified in advance in writing to the 
donor or surrogate” (Art. 20(2)). 
In our view, these provisions are highly problematic. Regarding in particular the establishment of 
a „presumed consent‟ regime for the use of “residual” body material for research purposes, we 
would argue that a “right to refuse” is not enough and that informed consent for the use of 
biological material for a diagnostic and/or therapeutic purpose cannot be interpreted as an 
implicit authorisation to use the material for research purposes. In our view, consent to use 
material for research should not be taken as implicit but should be given explicitly by the donor.  
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In the consent regime we would advocate, each body material sample would be assigned a code 
when it is procured, clearly showing if the donor: 
- has not given consent for the use of the material for scientific research (e.g. a code 
starting with or ending in A); or 
- has given consent for the use of the material for research concerning the disease(s) the 
donor suffers from (e.g. a code starting with or ending in B); or 
- has given consent for the use of the material for scientific research in general (e.g. a code 
starting with or ending in C). 
Thus, the person concerned should receive clear and comprehensible information as to why it 
may be desirable for her body material to be used in research.
7
 On the basis of this information, 
and after being given an opportunity to ask questions, the person must be allowed to decide 
whether or not to agree to the use of her material for research, with the option being available in 
the former case (i.e. agreeing) to distinguish between, on the one hand, use for research 
concerning the disease(s) from which the donor suffers (if any) and, on the other hand, use for 
scientific research in general. The person concerned must equally be allowed to decide, in either 
of the two cases of agreement just mentioned, whether she agrees to the body material being used 
in projects of a commercial nature, and this decision should also be reflected in the coding of the 
material (e.g. B- or B+; C- or C+). 
If the person concerned is also being treated – with treatment and research potentially being 
combined – we deem it necessary to explain clearly that any opposition to the use of the material 
for research purposes would have no influence whatsoever on the treatment received by the 
person. This may reduce the likelihood that patients feel obliged to consent, in order not to 
jeopardize (the quality of) their treatment.  
The frequently mentioned argument that asking for consent for the use of body material for 
research requires too much time and involves too many practical problems, is not justified in our 
view, given that in all cases where the biological material is taken for diagnosis and/or treatment, 
                                                 
7
 We wish to emphasise that, when we use the words “her” or “his” body material, we are certainly not suggesting 
that people have or should have property rights in their body or in their body material (detached or not). Rather, our 
arguments are based on persons‟ rights to control/ decide what may be done to body material procured from them. 
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at the moment when informed consent is requested for procuring the material for diagnosis and/or 
treatment, consent may also be explicitly requested for potential use of the material for research 
purposes.  
Of course we are aware that one of the reasons why so many in the biomedical field oppose the 
idea of asking consent for use of body material for research purposes is that in a great many cases 
the „other‟ consent (i.e. for procuring the body material for diagnostic and/or therapeutic 
purposes) is not even asked for, so requesting consent for research uses would not just be a matter 
of asking a second question after the first. However, one cannot justify a wrongful omission on 
the basis of an (earlier) wrongful omission. 
It could be objected that requiring informed consent to use body material for research (whether 
research in general or research regarding particular diseases) would either be an impediment to 
research or cannot generate a valid consent because in order for a consent to be valid it must not 
only be explicit but also very specific as to the nature and purpose of the research. According to 
this line of reasoning, if not specific the consent would be invalid and if specific it would be valid 
but the researchers would be obliged to keep going back to the donor for new specific consents 
for any new research use (since at the time of procurement of the body material scientists can not 
foresee how the field will develop in the future and hence which research uses of the material 
may become possible), thus significantly raising the price and slowing the pace of research.  
However, we are not convinced by this line of reasoning. In an ideal world, consent would indeed 
be very specific as to the nature and purpose of the research (as prescribed for example by the 
World Medical Association‟s Declaration of Helsinki, which since its most recent revision in 
2008 also applies to identifiable human body material) [14]. In the real world, it seems to us to be 
far more preferable for donors to have a guaranteed opportunity to give a somewhat less specific 
consent to research use of their body material than for donors simply to be presumed to have 
agreed to research use, merely because they have agreed to having body material taken for 
diagnosis or treatment. 
Admittedly, the question then arises whether the less specific consent our proposal would allow 
may still legitimately be called an „informed‟ consent or even a „consent‟ tout court. As 
Hofmann, Solbakk and Holm have rightly noted [8]: 
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[U]sing the term consent in situations that do not comply with the standard requirements for 
consent, such as understanding the scope and consequences of research, does undermine the 
concept of consent. It could therefore be argued that the eagerness to stick to the term 
“consent” even though the premises for consent are not met, is much less because of the 
interest of protecting research persons, than covering moral challenges by means of a device. 
This changes the objective of the protective aspirations of consent from the research person to 
the researcher. […] If understanding the scope and consequences of research is a sine qua non 
for consent, then consent to biobank research of a general and unspecified kind cannot be 
obtained, neither of a narrow brand nor of a broad one [and then] [t]here can be no informed 
consent because the research person cannot know important aspects of future research with 
respect to the biological material […].8 
Indeed, in relation to our proposal it may be more appropriate to use the term „explicit 
authorisation‟ or „explicit consent‟ instead of „informed consent‟. The explicit (as opposed to 
passive or presumed) character of the authorisation or consent is crucial, in our view, for it is 
important to recall that the ethical basis for the requirement for consent is respect for autonomy. 
Hence authorisation or consent models should not be “diluted” to the extent that autonomy no 
longer even has a place in the picture [7]. Each person has values which translate into aspirations 
and life plans. These values may conflict with the working methods and/or the goals of certain 
types of scientific research. Hence, even though biobank research, as compared with clinical 
research, may well involve limited health risks for donors, it may pose risks of ‘moral’ harms 
that are unrelated to privacy or „informational‟ issues and these seem to be ignored by most 
commentators. The “negligible risk” argument that is frequently invoked to defend the claim that 
in the case of biobank research there is no need to adopt strict measures such as explicit consent 
                                                 
8
 They propose an alternative which they call “conditional authorization”, a kind of contract that “should include 
explicit clauses” on: the moral and legal status of biological material; consequences with respect to risks and 
benefits; relationship to other sources of information; conditions for initiating further research on the basis of 
existing biobank material; and what would happen if any of the parties to the contract breach the conditions [8]. We 
do not advocate such an approach, for in our view it opens issues to negotiation which should not be negotiable, e.g. 
for example questions of ownership of the material in the biobank and of remuneration in the event of commercial 
potential. We believe this would lead to the unsavoury practice of donors authorising any kind of research and 
discarding any moral or other reservations they may have in hope of some revenue from commercial applications. A 
“conditional authorization” procedure would only seem desirable in the presence of a binding and effectively 
enforced legal framework which prevents such an outcome. 
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to protect participants, and that blanket or even presumed consent is sufficient, is thus 
unconvincing (even though we do not contest that biobank research poses less physical risk than 
clinical research). 
If scientists think that they have valid reasons to use particular biological material for research, 
they are fully entitled to explain to the potential donor why the research they envisage is crucial 
and why the person‟s contribution (via the provision of body material) would be of the utmost 
importance. However, this does not give scientists the right, in place of the interested party, to 
take the decision to use the material. The potential donor must have the opportunity of 
ascertaining whether the proposed use of the material for research is contrary to her moral 
values. If this opportunity is taken away from her and the decision is taken in her place, “in the 
interests of science”, then the material is being used to achieve an objective which is not her own 
and, consequently, the decision violates her dignity. It should also be noted that anonymising or 
coding the body material does not change this – the argument that moral reservations are no 
longer applicable if the material is anonymised or coded, so as to offer solid guarantees in terms 
of respect for privacy, totally misses the point because this offers guarantees only in terms of 
respect for privacy and does not in any way satisfy the need to respect persons and their 
autonomy. 
It may well be legitimate to expect citizens to contribute to progress in research, but one should 
never force this contribution by presuming consent instead of asking for it [12]. Admittedly, in 
some countries a large majority of the persons concerned are not, when asked, opposed to giving 
consent to research use [6]. However, we cannot and must not assume that everyone will agree. 
Again, it is highly desirable that citizens be informed of the value of certain kinds of research and 
encouraged to contribute, inter alia by donating body material – but this does not authorise 
researchers to use body material for research “in the name of science” without having first 
obtained the consent or authorisation of the person concerned. 
Some might argue that the Belgian biobank Law does require that: “For the application [of the 
provision regarding presumed consent], the intended use of the material as well as the possibility 
for the donor or surrogate to refuse, has to be notified in advance in writing to the donor or 
surrogate” (Art. 20(2)). This may at first sight create the impression that an absence of refusal 
will indeed imply a „valid‟ consent. However, it has already become clear that most, if not all, 
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Belgian hospitals intend to meet the advance notification requirement simply by adding a few 
words to their patient information brochure. In addition to the fact that this information is likely 
to be so limited and vague that it cannot possibly form the basis of a valid consent, the question 
arises as to whether the law grants persons who are too frail to read or insufficiently educated to 
understand the written information any rights at all to refuse research use of their body material. 
 
Special responsibilities placed on hospital ethics committees 
The Law also charges ethics committees with far-reaching responsibilities. Art. 21 provides that: 
“Any secondary use of the human body material, as well as the specific purpose thereof, must be 
the subject of a preliminary positive advice by an ethics committee […]. [In case it is impossible 
to ask the donor‟s consent to the secondary use, or should this question be exceptionally 
inappropriate], the same ethics committee shall issue a global advice. […]”. 
Moreover, it is specified in the same provision that the ethics committee must provide advice on 
“at least” the following issues:  
“1) the relevance of the secondary use and its design”;  
“2) the respect for the law and its executive decrees”;  
“3) the adequacy of the communicated information and the sufficiency of the specificity and 
scope of the consent”;  
“4) [if the case occurs], the impossibility of asking consent for the secondary use or the 
exceptionally inappropriate character of the question.” 
The main problem with this provision is that the responsibilities listed are so extensive that it will 
be virtually impossible for the existing, heavily overburdened, ethics committees to meet them. 
Adding these responsibilities to their tasks will certainly not improve the quality of their 
decision-making. 
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Post mortem research uses of human body material: the problematic incorporation of the 
„presumed consent‟ principle applicable to post mortem removal of organs for 
transplantation 
Concerning post mortem removal of human body material, the Law stipulates that “For the 
removal after death, the articles 10 to 14 of the law of 13 June 1986 [amended] regarding the 
removal and transplantation of organs apply” (Art. 12).  
This results in a striking twofold extension of the “presumed consent” regime that governs 
cadaveric organ transplantation in Belgium: first, an extension from post mortem removal of 
organs to post mortem removal of any human body material that falls under the scope of this 
Law, and secondly, an extension from post mortem removal for transplantation (i.e. therapeutic) 
purposes to post mortem removal for research purposes.  
In view of the comments made in the previous section as to the illegitimacy of extrapolation from 
consent for uses of body material for therapeutic purposes to consent for research uses, it is to be 
welcomed that the Minister of Public Health has asked the Belgian Advisory Committee on 
Bioethics to give advice regarding the implications as well as the desirability of incorporating this 
provision into the biobank Law [11].
9
 
 
Conclusion 
The Belgian biobank Law has some features that, in our view, are laudable from an ethical point 
of view. For example, private biobanks, established to store human body material for later 
autologous use, are explicitly prohibited, in order to enable access to high quality healthcare for 
everybody. Some other praiseworthy provisions of the Law can, however, be easily 
circumvented. For example, while donors are granted an explicit right to receive important 
health-related information that is revealed during research, ascribing this obligation 
                                                 
9
 We cannot elaborate on these important questions here, but two particular concerns deserve a brief mention. Firstly, 
because of objections to research use, it is possible that more people will opt out from post mortem donation, so 
reducing the already limited supply of transplantable organs. Secondly, where the person has not expressed her 
wishes regarding post mortem organ donation, it would seem that post mortem attempts to secure consent from 
relatives are likely to stress transplantation and perhaps minimize or ignore research uses which would also be 
envisaged. 
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simultaneously to three different sets of actors may result in none taking responsibility. Still other 
aspects of the Law are clearly problematic, especially those concerning the introduction of a 
presumed consent regime for research uses of “residual” body material. The person concerned is 
denied the opportunity to determine whether the use of her body material for (particular) research 
goals is contrary to her moral values. This amounts to a violation of autonomy and human dignity 
in the interests of science. To remedy this shortcoming, while at the same time realising that 
informed consent as prescribed in the context of clinical research is too demanding as a standard 
for biobank research, we propose a consent or authorisation regime that offers potential donors 
the right to decide in advance – on the basis of the best available information at the time – 
whether they agree to their body material to be used in future research, with options regarding 
research goals and possible commercialisation clearly spelled out. 
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